Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters'perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives a generally liked candidate an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we construct and analyze a formal model to investigate under which conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambiguity per se.
Introduction
According to theories from psychology (see e.g. Granberg (1993) , Krosnick (2002) , and references therein) people prefer to be in a state of cognitive consistency. Therefore a voter prefers to believe that he agrees with political candidates he likes (for non-policy related reasons) and disagrees with candidates he dislikes. One way the voter can achieve this is by distorting his perceptions of the candidates'policy positions. He "pulls" the positions of liked candidates towards his own position and "pushes" the positions of disliked candidates away from it. In general this is called projection. More speci…cally, positive projection ("pulling") is called assimilation and negative projection ("pushing") is called contrast.
If we assume that voters cannot have counterfactual perceptions then projection of a candidate's policy position can only happen when the candidate is ambiguous. So if projection e¤ects exist and voters vote based on perceived policy positions then a generally liked candidate has an incentive to be ambiguous because of assimilation. This paper investigates under which conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.
We formulate and analyze an extension of the standard Downsian model that allows candidates to take ambiguous policy positions and introduces projection e¤ects in voters'perceptions of such positions. Ambiguous positions are modelled by intervals of policies. Each voter has an (exogenous) positive, neutral or negative non-policy related attitude towards each candidate. When we say that a voter likes (dislikes) a candidate it simply means that he has a positive (negative) attitude towards him. Voters'perceptions of announced ambiguous positions are represented by probability distributions. They use perceived expected utility to decide on who to vote for. By assuming that voters are risk averse we get that they dislike ambiguity per se, i.e. if there were no projection e¤ects. Thus any result predicting ambiguity is driven only by projection (assimilation).
Our …rst results answer the following question: Under which conditions can a candidate defeat the median by being ambiguous, i.e. win the election by taking an ambiguous position when the other candidate's position is …xed at the median? Loosely speaking, we show that if a candidate is liked by some voters and not disliked by too many then he can defeat the median. For example, a candidate who is not disliked by any voters can defeat the median if he is liked by an arbitrarily small group of voters.
Secondly, we consider the question of existence or non-existence of winning strategies (which must be ambiguous) for a candidate with an advantage due to voter attitudes and projection. Consider an advantaged candidate who is not disliked by any voters and liked by a majority and a disadvantaged candidate who is not liked by any voters. We show that the advantaged candidate has winning strategies if the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. So our model does predict ambiguity in equilibrium when projection is strong. When projection is not su¢ ciently strong then the advantaged candidate does not have winning strategies and the model does not have an equilibrium (not even in mixed strategies). So the advantaged candidate may not be able to win the election for sure, it depends on the strength of the assimilation e¤ect.
There is a large empirical literature on projection (see Granberg (1993) and Krosnick (2002) for surveys). A lot of studies using cross-sectional data do produce evidence that is consistent with projection e¤ects. Krosnick (2002) , however, points out that usually it is also consistent with alternative hypotheses, most notably policy based evaluation and persuation. A fairly recent study using crosssectional data is Merrill, Grofman and Adams (2001) . Their …ndings are consistent with projection, but they also show that most of their evidence could be explained by policy based evaluation (together with di¤erent interpretations of issue scales among voters). Krosnick (2002) reviews a few panel data studies that carefully seek to separate projection from policy based evaluation and persuation. They do not …nd compelling evidence of projection. He concludes that the existence of projection has not yet been convincingly demonstrated and that further empirical research is needed.
As mentioned above, we make the assumption that projection of political positions is based on exogenous non-policy related attitudes and that the voting decision is policy based (given perceptions of positions). Thus we have a combination of projection and policy based evaluation and it seems hard to cast any verdict on its validity given the existing empirical literature on projection. Furthermore, the type of projection we consider is actually quite modest because we rule out counterfactual perceptions. So unless a candidate is very ambiguous voters'perceptions of his position will not be too inaccurate. Therefore our model can still be relevant even if voters'perceptions are reasonably accurate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of related literature. In Section 3 we set up the model and present some examples of our general model of projection of ambiguous policy positions. Section 4 contains our results (all proofs are delegated to the Appendix). In Section 5 we discuss and conlude.
Related Literature
A number of theoretical models of ambiguity in electoral competition exist in the literature. Zeckhauser (1969) and Fishburn (1972) both consider lotteries in social choice with a discrete set of alternatives (Zeckhauser only considers sets with three alternatives). They show that a lottery can never be a Condorcet winner. Shepsle (1972) extends the standard Downsian model by forcing one of the candidates (the challenger) to take a lottery position, i.e. a non-degenerate proba-bility distribution over positions. The voters are expected utility maximizers. The main result is that if a majority of voters are risk loving on an interval containing the median, then the challenger can beat an incumbent at the median by taking a lottery position with mean equal to the median. However, both existence and non-existence of a winning position for the challenger can occur. Page (1976) is critical of Shepsle's theory of ambiguity. He notes that the prediction of ambiguity is not very strong because the challenger may not have a winning strategy. Also he questions whether (a majority of) voters are really risk loving. Furthermore he argues that lottery positions are not a good way of modelling ambiguous political positions because candidates do not express their positions in ways that can easily be perceived as objective probability distributions. Page also presents his own theory of political ambiguity called emphasis allocation theory. He considers a multidimensional space of policy and valence dimensions. Candidates choose which dimensions (issues) to emphasize and take positions in these dimensions. They are vague/ambiguous on issues they do not put any emphasis on. Voters evaluate a candidate by summing the utilities of the candidate's positions on the issues, weigthed by the candidate's emphasis on each issue. In an example it is shown that this leads to emphasis on consensus issues and ambiguity on issues of con ‡ict, no matter what the risk preferences of the voters are. In a footnote Page mentions that a possible di¤erent explanation of ambiguity could be that it allows for projection (p. 748).
McKelvey (1980) generalizes the results of Zeckhauser (1969) and Fishburn (1972) to continuous densities on R n . Furthermore he looks at the e¤ect of introducing exogenous non-zero levels of ambiguity in a special case of electoral competition. He shows that it does not disrupt existing equilibria. Glazer (1990) shows by some examples that risk loving voters are not necessary to get ambiguity in equilibrium in a two candidate electoral game. If there is uncertainty about the preferred policy of the candidates and the position of the median voter then ambiguity (not specifying a position) can be the equilibrium outcome of a model with simultaneous announcements. In a model with sequential announcements there can be ambiguity in equilibrium because the …rst mover does not want to make the second mover more informed about the position of the median voter.
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) considers a two period model. In the …rst period an incumbent decides on a policy. Before the second period elections are held and in the second period the winner enacts his preferred policy (…nal period play). Voters are imperfectly informed about the incumbents preferred policy so they vote using an estimate based on the …rst period policy. Therefore the incumbent can have an incentive to blur his policy preferences by being ambiguous, i.e. by choosing a noisy policy instrument. For a non-empty set of parameter values (including risk averse voters) it is optimal for the incumbent to choose a non-minimal level of ambiguity.
Aragones and Neeman (2000) analyze a two stage electoral game with two candidates. First the candidates simultaneously choose a point in the policy space (an ideology) and the choices become common knowledge. Then they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity. Candidates have a preference for winning and for being ambiguous because it leaves them with more ‡exibility in o¢ ce. Voters dislike ambiguity so candidates face a trade o¤ between a high probability of winning (there is uncertainty about the position of the median voter) and being ambiguous. The main result is that when having ‡exibility in o¢ ce is su¢ ciently important then there is policy divergence with a non-minimal level of ambiguity for both candidates. Otherwise there is policy convergence and no ambiguity.
In Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) a model with only three alternative policies and o¢ ce motivated politicians is considered. Ambiguous positions are modelled as probability distributions on the set of alternatives. It is known from Fishburn (1972) that if candidates are not restricted in their choice of distributions then any equilibrium will consist of degenerate distributions. But Aragones and Postlewaite restrict the candidates such that each of them must put a minimum of probability mass on one of the alternatives -the alternative that voters think is most likely chosen by the candidate after the election. Under that assumption the result of Fishburn is not valid anymore. The most clean result is found when candidates are uncertain about the level of intensity of the voters preferences (then candidates payo¤'s are continuous). In that case it holds that (under some further assumptions) there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium and in any such equilibrium candidates are ambiguous (distributions are non-degenerate).
Meirowitz (2005) models a US presidential election with primaries. Each candidate can choose to announce a policy in the primaries or to be ambiguous in the primaries and not announce a policy until the general election. Candidates must stick to their policy announcements and they are imperfectly informed about voter preferences. In equilibrium candidates choose not to announce a policies in the primaries because it enables them to learn more about the electorate before committing to a policy position and because a candidate announcing a position in the primaries will be more vulnerable to an unconstrained opponent in the general election.
Our model is also related to the theoretical literature on valence advantage/candidate quality (see e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) , Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005) ). In these models one candidate has an advantage which makes all voters prefer him over the other candidate if there is policy convergence. In our model a candidate can have an advantage due to voters'attitudes. But he can only make use of that advantage by being ambiguous which makes voters who like him assimilate his position. Voters' attitudes does not directly in ‡uence their voting behavior.
The Model
Our starting point is a standard one-dimensional spatial model with two candidates. We will extend that model by allowing candidates to take ambiguous policy positions and by introducing projection e¤ects in voters'perceptions of such positions. In the following we describe the model in detail.
The Candidates
Before the election the two candidates announce policy positions. Each candidate can announce either a certain position or an ambiguous position. A certain position is represented by a point in the policy space R. An ambiguous position is represented by a compact interval of policies. Thus the strategy space for each candidate can be written as
Announced positions are credible in the sense that the winning candidate must enact a policy in his announced interval. So certain positions are credible in the usual sense.
Each candidate's only objective is to win the election, none of them care about policy. Formally the preference relation of each candidate over the outcome of the election is given by win tie loose:
Finally we assume that the candidates are fully informed about the electorate and that this is common knowledge.
The Electorate
There is a continuum of voters and each of them has a preferred point in the policy space R. The distribution of preferred points is given by a density function v. We assume that v is continuous and that the support of v is an interval (bounded or unbounded). Without loss of generality we assume that the median voter is located at x = 0, i.e.
Each voter has a utility function on the policy space. Let the utility function of the median voter be u 0 : R ! R. Then the utility function u x 0 of a voter with preferred point at x 0 is de…ned by
We assume that u 0 is symmetric around 0, continuous on R and twice continuously di¤erentiable on R n f0g with
Thus all voters are strictly risk averse.
We will now model how voters decide on which candidate to vote for. If each candidate announces a certain position then each voter simply votes for the candidate announcing the position with the highest utility. If at least one of the candidates announces an ambiguous position then it is less obvious how the voters should decide on who to vote for. We want them to use expected utility. But that is not straightforward since an ambiguous position is represented by an interval of policies rather than a probability distribution over policies. For a voter to use expected utility to evaluate an ambiguous position he has to somehow associate a probability distribution with the interval representing the position. The distribution represents the voter's perception of the ambiguous position. Or, to put it di¤erently, the voter's belief about which policy the candidate will enact if elected. How voters perceive ambiguous positions is a crucial element of our model and we will use the rest of this section to describe it.
As mentioned in the introduction, the main idea is that a voter's perception of an ambiguous position depends on whether he has a positive, negative or neutral (non-policy related) attitude towards the candidate announcing it. If the voter likes the candidate, i.e. has a positive attitude towards him, then he will put most of the probability mass on the points of the interval that are closest to his preferred policy (assimilation). If the voter dislikes the candidate then he will do the opposite (contrast). And if the voter neither likes nor dislikes the candidate then he will spread the probability mass evenly across the interval. We will formalize this below.
For all voters the neutral perception of an ambiguous position is given by the uniform distribution on the interval. So the perceived expected utility of the ambiguous position [A a; A + a] for a neutral voter with preferred point x 0 is 1 2a
Since voters are strictly risk averse it follows that neutral voters dislike ambiguity.
To model assimilation perceptions …rst consider a voter with preferred point x 0 1 and a positive attitude towards a candidate announcing [ 1; 1]. Thus we are modelling assimilation from the right of an ambiguous position centered at the median. The probability distribution that the voter associates with the ambiguous position is given by some cumulative distribution function F 1 1 . So the voter's perceived expected utility of the candidate's position is
We assume that F 
The …rst condition says that there is no "counterfactual perception". Since the winning candidate must enact a policy in his announced interval the voter does not put any probability mass on policies outside the interval. The second condition is a convenient mathematical way of saying that the voter is assimilating the candidate's position from the right. It means that, for any x 2 [ 1; 1], F 1 1 puts at least as much probability mass to the right of x as the uniform distribution does (and strictly more for some x). Thus we see that, relative to the neutral perception given by the uniform distribution, the voter "pulls" probability mass to the right, i.e. towards his own preferred position.
We model assimilation of [ 1; 1] from the left by symmetry. Therefore the assimilation perception for a voter with preferred point x 0 1 is given by the distribution function F 1 1 de…ned by
Because with this de…nition we have that, for any x 2 [ 1; 1], F to rule out counterfactual perception. Formalizing the pulling of probability mass towards x 0 is a bit more tricky in this case than it was for "exterior voters", but the idea is the same. We want the distribution function to put more probability mass on points close to x 0 than the uniform distribution does. More precisely we assume that, for any x > 0, F x 0 1 puts at least as much probability mass on the interval (x 0 x; x 0 + x) as the uniform distribution does (and strictly more for some x). This can be written formally as
(with " > " for some x).
To have symmetry of perceptions we assume that, for any x 0 2 ( 1; 1),
Thus we are done modelling how voters assimilate the ambiguous position [ 1; 1]. Now we will extend the model to cover assimilation of all ambiguous strategies.
First consider assimilation of [ a; a] for some a > 0. In this case we use a simple scaling of the distribution functions de…ning assimilation of [ 1; 1] . More speci…cally the assimilation perceptions of voters with x 0 0 are de…ned as follows (assuming symmetry this is all we need).
For a voter with
For a voter with 0 x 0 < a the distribution function is denoted F
It is easily seen that these distribution functions satisfy conditions that are analogous to the ones we imposed on the F U [ a;a] (x) for all x 2 R (with " < " for some x) and, for any 0 x 0 < a,
Finally we will de…ne assimilation of intervals of the type [A a; A + a] where A 6 = 0. In that case we simply translate the distribution functions de…ning assimilation of a 's. Contrast perceptions are de…ned analogously to the way we have just de…ned assimilation perceptions. So, for example, the distribution function representing the contrast perception of voters to the right of some interval is strictly …rst order stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution on the interval. We use the same notation for contrast perceptions as for assimilation perceptions except that we replace the F 's by G's. So the distribution functions representing contrast perception of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right of the interval is denoted G We make the technical assumption that, for each i = 1; 2, the sets
are Lebesgue measurable (such that we can integrate over them). Then the fraction of voters that have a positive/neutral/negative towards Candidate i is Z
Before we move on we will give some examples of our model of assimilation. We will get back to these examples later on.
Example 1
In our …rst example, the assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right is given by the distribution function F 1 1 de…ned by
where 0 < < 1 is a parameter. This corresponds to a voter to the right believing that with probability the policy will be x = 1 (the policy in the interval closest to his preferred point) and with probability 1 the policy will be drawn from the uniform distribution on
We want a voter with preferred point x 0 2 ( 1; 1) to have the same type of perception, i.e. to believe that with probability the policy will be x = x 0 and with probability 1 the policy will be drawn from the uniform distribution. The distribution function corresponding to this perception is
It is easily seen that these distribution functions satisfy the required conditions. The example is extended to cover assimilation of all ambiguous positions as described above (by symmetry, scaling and translation).
Example 2
In our second example, the assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right is given by the density function f 1 1 de…ned by
where 0 < 1 is a parameter.
We see how a voter to the right of the interval "pulls" probability mass towards his own preferred point. And we see that he does so without putting any probability mass on points outside the interval. It is easily seen that the distribution function corresponding to the density function above is
And then it is straightforward to show that the distribution strictly …rst order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1] . The assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters with x 0 2 [0; 1) is given by the density functions f
Given our de…nition of assimilation for "exterior voters" this is a natural way of de…ning it for "interior voters". In each case a voter puts a constant probability density of
on the half of the interval that is closest to his preferred point and a constant probability density of 1 2 on the rest. It is straightforward to check that the distribution functions given by the f x 0 1 's satisfy the required conditions. As with our …rst example it is extended to cover assimilation of all ambiguous positions as described above.
Results
In this section we will address the questions in the list below. Our answers will help us understand how and why our introduction of ambiguous positions and projection e¤ects changes the predictions of the standard model.
Under which conditions does the median voter theorem break down because
candidates can take advantage of the assimilation e¤ect by being ambiguous? More speci…cally, when can a candidate win the election by taking an ambiguous position when the other candidate's position is …xed at the median?
2. Under which conditions does a candidate with an advantage due to voters' non-policy related attitudes have a winning strategy? I.e. when does such a candidate have an ambiguous position that wins the election for him no matter what position the other candidate takes?
3. What can we say about existence and properties of Nash equilibria?
All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
Defeating the Median
Our …rst result shows that a candidate who is liked by a strict majority of voters can defeat the median, i.e. win the election when the other candidate's position is …xed at the median. Furthermore it shows that he can do so by being ambiguous around the median. Note that no additional assumptions on voter utility functions or voter perceptions are needed. The result holds even if voters are very risk averse and the assimilation e¤ect is very small. 
Then there exists some a 0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a a 0 , Candidate i defeats the median by announcing the ambiguous position [ a; a]:
Being liked by a strict majority of voters is a necessary condition for a candidate to be able to defeat the median by an ambiguous position of the type [ a; a], a > 0. That follows immediately from the assumption that all voters are strictly risk averse. However, the following result shows that a candidate who is liked by less than a majority may be able to defeat the median by taking an ambiguous position that is not centrered at the median. The sets X + i and X i , i = 1; 2, are de…ned by
We let E 
Then there exist F 
Winning Strategies
Our …rst observation is that Candidate i does not have a winning strategy if the set of voters who like him (L 1 i (f1g)) is not a strict majority. Because in that case Candidate j can always get at least a tie by announcing the midpoint of Candidate i's position. So winning strategies can only exist if at least one candidate is liked by a strict majority of voters. Here we will only consider the case where one candidate (Candidate 1) is not disliked by any voters and liked by a strict majority and the other candidate (Candidate 2) is not liked by any voters. Thus we have
and L 2 (x) 0 for all x 2 R:
Assuming that Candidate 2 is not liked by any voters means that checking if some position of Candidate 1 is a winning strategy becomes a lot simpler. Because in that case we only need to check if Candidate 2 can get at least a tie against it by taking a certain position. We will make some additional assumptions on voter utility functions and assimilation perceptions. We assume that voter utility functions are of the form u 0 (x) = jxj for some > 1:
With respect to assimilation perceptions we loosely speaking assume that if two voters have preferred points that are close then their assimilation perceptions are also close. More precisely we assume that for any sequence (x n ) n2N in [ 1; 1] and any continuous function f on [ 1; 1],
The following result gives conditions for existence and non-existence of winning strategies for Candidate 1. Remember that E 
Theorem 4.4
With the additional assumptions from this subsection the following two statements hold.
Suppose there exists a > 0 such that
Then there exists an a 0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a a 0 , [ a; a] is a winning strategy for Candidate 1. The following lemma makes it easier to check for non-existence of winning strategies when some additional assumptions on assimilation perceptions are satis…ed.
Suppose
Lemma 4.5 Suppose that, for all 0 < x 0 < 1 and x > 0,
Furthermore suppose that
1 for all 0 < x 0 < 1: Then the condition in part 2. of Theorem 4.4 is satis…ed if
The new condition on the F We will now use our results to analyze cases where assimilation perceptions are given by the two examples presented earlier.
Example 1
With this type of assimilation we have
It is straightforward to show that the additional assumptions from this subsection and the assumptions in Lemma 4.5 are satis…ed. Thus we see that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if
By straightforward calculations this inequality can be reduced to
For any > 1 the expression on the left hand side is negative for = 0, positive for = 1 and di¤erentiable (w.r.t. ) on [0; 1] with positive derivative. Therefore there exists a ( ) 2 (0; 1) such that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if ( ). We can calculate (2) explicitly by solving a second order equation. We get (2) = p 13 1 6 :43:
Our general results does not directly allow us to conclude that Candidate 1 has winning strategies if > ( ). But we will now show that this is in fact the case (assuming that Candidate 1 is liked by all voters in some neighborhood of the median). For each 1 x 0 0 there exists a unique C x 0 > x 0 such that
(I.e. for a voter at x 0 , C x 0 is the certainty equivalent of F It follows from the lemma that
) and thus C 0 < E 1 1 . Therefore we have
And then we can use Theorem 4.4 to conlude that Candidate 1 has winning strategies.
Example 2
Again it is straightforward to show that the additional assumptions from this subsection and the assumptions in Lemma 4.5 are satis…ed. Thus we see that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if
For any > 1 the expression on the left hand side is negative for = 0, positive for = 1 and di¤erentiable (w.r. Our general results does not directly allow us to conclude that Candidate 1 has winning strategies if > ( ). But we will now show that this is in fact the case (assuming that Candidate 1 is liked by all voters in some neighborhood of the median). As in Example 1 it su¢ ces to show that C 
Nash Equilibria 4.3.1 Pure Strategies
Here we will make some observations about the existence and properties of pure strategy Nash equilibria. First, consider the case where neither candidate can defeat the median. Then (s 1 ; s 2 ) = (0; 0), i.e. convergence to the median, is an equilibrium because neither candidate can win the election by deviating to another position. Furthermore, if neither of the candidates are liked by exactly 50% of the voters then (0; 0) is the unique equilibrium (each candidate can then defeat any position di¤erent from the median). Thus the median voter theorem holds in this situation. If a candidate is liked by exactly 50% of the voters (and thus disliked by the other 50% -otherwise he could defeat the median) then there could exist equilibria where he is ambiguous. But the outcome would always be a tie and he could also get a tie by deviating to the median.
Secondly, consider the case where one candidate (Candidate 1) can defeat the median but the other (Candidate 2) cannot. If Candidate 2 is liked by strictly less than 50% of the voters then Candidate 1 can defeat any position of Candidate 2. Therefore we have that in any equilibrium Candidate 1 must win the election. Thus (s 1 ; s 2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if s 1 is a winning strategy for Candidate 1 (which must be ambiguous). So we have existence of Nash equilibria if and only if we have existence of winning strategies for Candidate 1. If Candidate 2 is liked by exactly 50% of the voters then the equilibrium outcome is a tie if Candidate 2 has a position that gives him at least a tie against any position of Candidate 1. If Candidate 2 does not have such a position then we again have that in any equilibrium Candidate 1 must win the election. In both situations it follows that in any equilibrium at least one candidate will be ambiguous.
Finally, consider the case where both candidates can defeat the median. Without loss of generality assume that Candidate 1 is liked by at least as many voters as Candidate 2. If Candidate 2 is liked by strictly less than 50% of the voters then we have that (s 1 ; s 2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if s 1 is a winning strategy for Candidate 1 (Candidate 1 can defeat any position of Candidate 2). If Candidate 2 is liked by at least 50% of the voters then consider the numbers
v(x)dx; i = 1; 2; j 6 = i: P i is the share of voters who has a more positive attitude towards Candidate i than towards Candidate j. If P i > P j then Candidate i can defeat any position of Candidate j by imitation. Thus it follows that (s 1 ; s 2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if s i is a winning strategy for Candidate i. If P i = P j then each candidate can get a tie against any position of the other candidate (again by imitation). Thus any equilibrium outcome must be a tie and both candidates must be ambiguous in equilibrium.
Mixed Strategies
We have just seen that when at least one candidate can defeat the median, then, except perhaps for some very special cases, pure strategy Nash equilibria only exist if one candidate has a winning strategy. And we know from earlier that winning strategies do not always exist even in the extreme case where one candidate is liked by all voters and the other candidate is disliked by all voters. So it is natural to ask the question if mixed strategy equilibria exist when pure strategy equilibria do not. Consider again the model with the extra assumptions from the subsection on winning strategies. The question then is if there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium when Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. The result below shows that when the condition for non-existence of winning strategies in Theorem 4.4 is satis…ed then the answer is no (except perhaps in a knife edge case).
Theorem 4.9 Suppose all the assumptions from the subsection on winning strategies are satis…ed. If
1 (x) for all 0 x 0 < 1 then there does not exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
With respect to our examples of assimilation, the theorem implies that if < ( ) (in Example 1) or < ( ) (in Example 2) then a mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist.
Discussion
Our goal in this paper has been to theoretically investigate if positive projection (assimilation) of policy positions can explain why some politicians are ambiguous with respect to their issue positions. To do that we have extended the standard Downsian model of electoral competition by allowing candidates to take ambiguous policy positions and by introducing projection e¤ects in voters'perceptions of such positions. By assuming that voters dislike ambiguity per se (if attitudes are neutral then voters dislike ambiguity because of risk aversion) we have made sure that projection is the driving force behind any result predicting ambiguity.
In the standard model the median defeats any other position. Therefore a natural …rst step was to …nd out under which conditions a candidate can defeat the median by being ambiguous. We presented necessary and su¢ cient conditions. We saw that it may su¢ ce for a candidate to be liked by only a small group of voters as long as he is not disliked by too many. For example, if a candidate is not disliked by any voters then he can defeat the median if he is liked by an arbitrarily small group of voters.
While having at least one candidate that is able to defeat the median by being ambiguous is certainly a necessary condition for predicting ambiguity it is far from su¢ cient. Electoral competition is a strategic situation and there is no reason to assume that one candidate will announce the median if he can do better by taking a di¤erent position. Therefore our next step was to look at existence and non-existence of winning strategies (which must be ambiguous). We restricted attention to the case where one candidate is not liked by any voters and made some additional assumptions on voter utility functions and perceptions. We saw that if the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong then a candidate who is not disliked by any voters and liked by a strict majority has winning strategies. But even if he is liked by all voters he may not have winning strategies. So our model does predict that a generally liked candidate will be ambiguous if he is running against a candidate who is generally not liked and the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. But even a candidate with the largest possible advantage due to voters' non-policy related attitudes may not have a position that wins the election for him (if the assimilation e¤ect is not strong enough). That is a rather striking result.
While the possible non-existence of winning strategies even for a candidate with the largest possible advantage due to voters'attitudes is an interesting feature of the model it is also problematic. Because, as our observations on Nash equilibria revealed, when at least one candidate can defeat the median then non-existence of winning strategies implies non-existence of pure strategy equilibria (except perhaps in some very special cases). So when the median voter theorem breaks down but neither candidate has a winning strategy then our model does not give us clear predictions in terms of pure strategy equilibria. And we have also seen that turning attention to mixed strategy equilibria is not a solution to this problem. So an obvious direction for further research is to come up with a model that give better equilibrium predictions.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1.
For each n 2 N let
Since a strict majority of voters likes Candidate i there exists an N 2 N such that X N i contains the preferred points of a strict majority of voters. We will prove that there exists an a 0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a a 0 , all voters with x 0 2 X 
for some 2 [ a; a] (actually between 0 and x). And thus it follows that
Using this inequality we get (E 1 1 denotes the expected value of Using the inequality above we get that, for all a > 0 with aA + a <
The last expression is strictly greater than u x 0 (0) for small a > 0. So it follows that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x 0 2 X Using the "Taylor inequality" from above we get that, for all a > 0 with
The last expression is is strictly greater than u x 0 (0) for small a > 0. So it follows that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x 0 2 X Suppose that assimilation perceptions are as in Example 1 (for some 0 < < 1). Let contrast perceptions be given by
Suppose Candidate i announces some interval. We will show that at least 50% of the voters strictly prefer the median over the interval. The interval can be written as
[aA a; aA + a] for some A 2 R; a > 0:
For A = 0 all voters with L i (x 0 ) 0 (at least 50%) strictly prefer the median (by risk aversion).
For A E . Then it is straightforward to check that for each voter with
the mean of the voter's perception of the interval is further away from x 0 than the median (0). Thus all these voters strictly prefer the median over the interval (by risk aversion). Since the set above is the complement of X + i these voters constitute at least a weak majority. If A 2 ( E 1 1 ; 0) then it follows analogously that all voters with x 0 = 2 X i strictly prefer the median over the interval. Again that is at least a weak majority. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4.
1. First we show that
is a continuous function of
The …rst term in the last expression converges to zero because of the continuity of u 0 and the compactness of [ 1; 1] . The second term converges to zero by the continuity assumption on the F x 0 1 's. That proves the continuity of
1 (x). Then we can …nd a 0 < C < E 1 1 and an " > 0 such that
The following two claims …nishes the proof of the …rst part of the theorem.
Claim A: For su¢ ciently small a > 0, [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 defeats any y 2 ( aC; aC) announced by Candidate 2.
Proof: Choose an N 2 N such that a strict majority of voters have preferred points in the set
It su¢ ces to show that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x 0 2 X N 1 , x 0 > 0 will prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over aC announced by Candidate 2. Since 0 < C < E 
Thus we see that all voters with x 0 2 [ a; a"] strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over any certain position y aC.
Voters with x 0 2 ( ; a) has the same perception of [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 as voters with x 0 = a. And they are less (absolute) risk-averse on [ a; a]. Therefore these voters also prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over any y aC. By Taylor's theorem it is easily seen that voters with x 0 = and a neutral attitude towards Candidate 1 strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over any y aC when a is small enough. The same is true for voters with x 0 < because they are less risk averse on [ a; a].
Thus all voters with x 0 a" strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 to any y aC for a su¢ ciently small. By symmetry it follows that, for a su¢ ciently small, all voters with x 0 a" stricly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 to any y aC. That ends the proof of the claim.
2. Suppose Candidate 1 announces [A a; A + a] for some A 0 (if A < 0 the proof is analogous). Then, by the homogeneity of u 0 and the condition in the statement, we have that all voters with x 0 2 (A a; A) strictly prefer A aE 1 1 announced by Candidate 2 over the interval announced by Candidate 1. By risk aversion the same is true for voters with x 0 A a. Thus at least 50% of the voters strictly prefer A aE By the …rst assumption in the lemma it follows that, for all 0 < x 0 < 1,
Therefore we have that, for all x 0 2 (0; is (weakly) closer to x 0 than E x 0 1 . So by risk aversion it follows that, for all
Thus the condition in part 2. of Theorem 4.4 is satis…ed. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.6.
U > x 0 be de…ned by
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the lottery "0 with probability , C 0 U with probability 1 " for a voter at x 0 is greater than or equal to C x 0 . The certainty equivalent of the same lottery for a voter at 0 is C 0 . And since voters at x 0 are less absolute risk averse on [0; C 0 U ] than voters at 0 the certainty equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a voter at x 0 . Thus we must have C So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the lottery "0 with probability , C 0 U with probability 1 " for a voter at x 0 is greater than or equal to C ] . Therefore we have that for each x 0 2 [ 1; 1 2 ] ,
And since a voter at x 0 < 1 2 is less risk averse than a voter at ] (same argument as in the two previous proofs). 2 Proof of Theorem 4.9.
Suppose ( 1 ; 2 ) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
Let " > 0. Then there exists a 0 > 0 such that 2 puts less than " probability mass on the certain positions in ( a 0 ; a 0 ) n f0g. Therefore, by announcing the ambiguous position [ a; a] for a su¢ ciently close to zero Candidate 1 can defeat 2 with probability greater than 1 " (Candidate 1 defeats all certain positions not in ( a 0 ; a 0 ) n f0g). Thus it follows that in the equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ), Candidate 1 must win with probability one.
Pick A 2 R, a > 0 such that, for any neighborhood B of ( A; a), 1 puts positive probability on f[A a; A + a]j(A; a) 2 Bg:
The following claim shows that for some B Candidate 2 has a position that defeats all positions in the set above. Thus it follows that in the equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ), Candidate 2 must win with some positive probability. That is a contradiction. Proof: We will only do the proof for A 0, the other case is completely analogous. By announcing A+ aE . We have to show that he also defeats "nearby" ambiguous positions. Suppose not. Then there exists a sequence (A n ; a n ) that converges to ( A; a) and satis…es that, for any n, [A n a n ; A n + a n ] announced by Candidate 1 gets at least a tie against A + aE (If x 0 < A n a n then F An;an means F
An an
An;an and so on). By using the de…nitions of F 1 's in the section on winning strategies it follows that there is convergence for all x 0 's. Thus we have a contradiction. 2
